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have also contributed to this    
report. The international process for tackling climate change endured several backslashes since
the signing of the Paris Agreement in 2015. Issues around the respective responsibilities
are not fully solved yet. The underlying question of how to share efforts in order to reach
a Zero Net Emissions state remains largely unclear and the INDCs process has still to
deliver a pathway for decarbonization.
In the last years, the concept of global carbon budget has emerged as one of the most
direct ways to materialize the constraint from the climate. It mainly relies on the idea that
only a limited quantity of carbon dioxide can be released in the atmosphere if we want to
stay below the 2°C temperature change threshold above pre-industrial levels and, if
possible, below +1.5°C, as agreed at the Paris Conference in 2015. By comparing what is
in our carbon budget to what is done to reduce the carbon footprint of societies, we
calculate a distance to the climate constraint. Expressed in euro this distance, called the
“climate debt”, measure how much we avoid paying by delaying climate change mitiga-
tion. Using different rules for sharing the burden, acknowledging there is no negotiated
nor consensual way to share it, we calculate this climate debt for main EU countries.
The first step of the following work is to compute a carbon budget for both the European
Union and member countries mixing population based sharing (egalitarian) for EU and
rest of world budget and emission based sharing (grandfathering) for EU countries. In a
second step, we determine how many years are left before these budgets are depleted at
the regional and national levels, which requires assumptions on the future emissions
trend. Combining these trends with assumptions on the abatement cost of remaining
carbon dioxide emissions after the depletion date allows us to evaluate the “climate
debt”. More precisely, the “climate debt” is the amount of money that will have to be
invested or paid by countries for them not to exceed their carbon budget.
This work led us to three key policy insights. First, there are few years left for major Euro-
pean countries before exhausting their carbon budget under the +2°C target. As for the
+1.5°C target, carbon budgets are exhausted for EU main countries, which are thus
running excessive climate deficits. Secondly, the carbon debt should be considered as
one of the major issues of the decades to come since in the baseline scenario it represents
about 50% of the EU GDP to stay below +2°C (120% for staying below +1.5°C). Thirdly,
the results of the estimation of this carbon debt are subject to numerous moral, ethical
and technical assumptions that should motivate further and urgent investigations on this
subject, critical to climate change mitigation, from both state bodies and independent
research institutes.
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1.
See Caney S., 2013. “Justice and  the 
distribution of greenhouse gas   
emissions.” Global Social Justice,     
pp. 58-81.Climate change and global warming are often spoken of in the same breath as 
limited natural resources and the optimal way to manage the small amount that is still 
available. Despite all the pledges that have been made so far, both on the national and 
global stages, there is still a lot to be done before countries dedicate enough economic 
and political means to really tackle this issue. 
The 24th Conference of Parties that has been launched on the 3rd of December in 
Katowice, Poland, is part and parcel of the traditional diplomatic apparatus aiming at 
promoting fruitful talks and agreements with effects. This is an additional occasion to 
realize that some countries are not especially welcoming structural changes in their 
energy mixes. To be more precise, it seems to be the place where countries always try 
and advocate for differentiated historical responsibilities in the global warming 
phenomena currently happening as well as differentiated capabilities to address these 
issues.
In such a framework, it seems more urgent than ever to delineate countries' relative 
responsibilities and absolute contributions to emissions reductions in order to remain 
in line with the 2015 Paris Agreement. To do so, we outline in the subsequent work a 
methodology aiming at computing climate debts at the national and regional scales. 
1. Carbon budget, historical carbon adjustment  
and burden share
Standard definition
In the last decades, it has become widely acknowledged that global warming is almost 
linearly related to cumulative emissions of carbon dioxide (Allen et al., 2009; Matthews 
et al., 2009; Raupach et al., 2011). This relationship between temperature increase and 
carbon emissions can be used in order to define the cumulative quantity of carbon 
dioxide than can be emitted until we reach a given global temperature change target. 
In particular, it is the basis for the development of carbon budgets. More precisely, a 
carbon budget is a statistical indicator aiming at measuring how many tonnes of 
carbon dioxide can be released in the atmosphere before we cross given temperature 
change thresholds. 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report 
on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (SR1.5), if we 
want to ensure a probability of 67% that global temperature change will remain below 
+2°C from preindustrial levels, we should not emit more than 1,320 billion tons of 
carbon dioxide (GtCO2) from now until the end of times globally. 
Of course, the computation of the carbon budget is always disputable as it relies on 
climate models which, in turn, depend on many assumptions and hypotheses that can 
be discussed. Nonetheless, computing global carbon budgets remains less controver-
sial than sharing these budgets between regions and countries.1
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2.
At least, those that are not endoge-
nous to population size. 
3.
Since we only have emissions data 
until 2015, we assume that 2016 and 
2017 CO2 emissions levels are the 
same as 2015 emissions levels. Different ways of burden sharing among EU countries
As far as national environmental public policies are concerned, the global carbon 
budget needs to be broken down into smaller parts in order to enlighten decision 
makers and weigh in on public policy design. National budgets must be estimated to 
delineate countries' responsibilities and drive their emissions reductions. So far, the 
literature has underlined a continuum of burden sharing methods, whose two 
endpoints are the egalitarian approach on the one hand and full grandfathering on the 
other (Gignac et Matthews, 2015; Giraud et al., 2017; Raupach et al., 2014).
The egalitarian sharing method consists in allocating each and every human being the 
same right to emit carbon dioxide. This approach is utterly blind to structural inequali-
ties between countries2 and puts at the forefront present equality between people as a 
sharing principle. To some extent, it is a way to erase past differences between coun-
tries and hence make people equally responsible from now on when it comes to 
fighting global warming and climate change.
The grandfathering sharing method relies on the idea that the global carbon budget 
should be divided along the criterion of current carbon emissions. It means that the 
weight of each country in global emissions remains stable over time. This conservative-
ness can be interpreted to capture structural national elements that are only slowly 
modified or cannot be changed at all, which is for instance the case of the access to 
renewables or the exposure to particularly rough climate conditions. 
Such measures leave aside the issue of historical responsibility. In order not to evade 
this issue, some authors such as H. Damon Matthews have suggested computing an 
additional measure of historical carbon adjustment. This indicator aims at determining, 
for each year, whether countries have emitted more or less than their quotas and 
aggregates the deviations from the quotas over the time period chosen. 
EU carbon budget 
We attempt at estimating the European Union's regional responsibility, in aggregate, 
in the decarbonization process. To do so, we first use the egalitarian approach—with 
2015 as reference year—in order to compute the regional carbon budget at the 
European aggregate level. Then, we allocate to each member country its proper 
national budget using full grandfathering—based on emissions ratios of 2015 too. 
Nonetheless, in order to consider differentiated national historical responsibilities since 
1990, we compute in a second moment a historical carbon adjustment per country over 
the 1990-2017 period,3 following Matthews' method. Finally, we compute adjusted 
carbon budgets both at the regional and national scales. To the extent our baseline 
carbon budget computing method cashes in on both the egalitarian and the grandfa-
thering methods, we thereafter call it the “hybrid” approach. 
Using the hybrid sharing method with 2015 as a reference year credits the European 
Union with a carbon budget of 91 GtCO2 if we consider the +2°C scenario. This 
amounts to approximately 30 more years if current emission levels remain unchanged. 
At the regional scale, the historical carbon adjustment since 1990 over the 28 member 
countries of the European Union amounts to 49.7 GtCO2. This means that, updating 
previous results on the basis of historical carbon adjustments leads to a way smaller 
carbon budget for the European Union. More precisely, it falls down to 41 GtCO2 
under the +2°C constraint. Furthermore, carbon budgets are quite dispersed among 
member countries. Under the +2°C constraint, computing hybrid budgets makes 
France the country with the most important carbon budget with 6.2 GtCO2 while N° 45, 11 décembre 2018.
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4.
The dynamic is extrapolated until 
reaching a zero net emissions level.
5.
Sensitivity tests on the different        
dimensions that impact the carbon 
budget are presented in the main  
document of the IASES report.Germany settles at the second position with an adjusted carbon budget of 4.8 GtCO2
(as opposed to 21 GtCO2 before adjustment). Spain, Italy and Poland follow.  
It is also instructive to cast a glance at per capita results, which largely redistribute 
emissions rights within the European Union. More precisely, Bulgaria, Croatia, Austria, 
Romania and Poland then appear to have the greatest carbon budgets per capita. 
France ends up at the 9th position while Germany and the United Kingdom respec-
tively hold the 17th and 18th positions. 
2. From carbon budget to climate debt
Trend of emissions and exhaustion of carbon budget
The second step of this approach is to determine the emissions reduction pathways of 
the different EU countries. To do so, we use the ENERDATA Enerfuture Scenario, which 
profiles the trend of emissions until 2040.4 The central scenario Ener-blue trajectory is 
built upon the current INDCs projection of emissions, leading to a +3°C increase in 
global temperature. This trajectory is following the same pace as the latest trend of 
emissions reduction observed in EU countries and can therefore be seen as a current 
policy scenario.
The baseline is defined for the +2°C target and what we deem to be a middle point in 
the burden sharing question, that is to say the previously details “hybrid” sharing 
method. Different views on the way to share the burden will lead to different alloca-
tions of the global carbon budget. Those are moral or political hypotheses and we are 
not to decide which ones are the right ones. Moreover, these results are depending on 
technical and forecasting assumptions that determine the pace in the emission reduc-
tion, and which are by definition speculative.5
Figure 1. Per capita adjusted carbon budget (in tCO2)
Sources: authors' computations, based on IPCC SR1.5, UNFCCC emissions data, Le Quéré et al. (2018) Historical Carbon 
Budget (version 1.3), UN World Population Prospects (2017 revision), AMECO online (11/2018) for 2017 GDP. Calculated 
for +2°C 2/3 probability, hybrid share and consumer approach.
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OFCE  policy brief |  5The striking result exhibited in the Figure 2 is that the +2°C budget is nearly exhausted 
for almost all the EU countries, with on average only 10 years left. Such a short horizon 
means that a significant current share of the capital stock (productive capital, residen-
tial buildings, tertiary buildings, means of transportation, etc.) has to be considered as 
stranded under this carbon budget constraint. In other words, already built capital 
stock will eventually been decommissioned if not seriously retrofitted. This statement 
advocates for providing a monetary evaluation, which we attempt to do through the 
evaluation of a climate debt. 
The climate debt valuation through abatement cost
The climate debt for a given country is calculated by estimating the cost of a specific 
scenario. Once the carbon budget is exhausted, in order to fulfil its pledge, the country 
implements overnight and for the following years abatement techniques that shrink its 
remaining emissions down to zero. 
We assume in our estimations that only a backstop technology can remove the 
remaining CO2 in the atmosphere until the carbon budget depletion date. The set of 
assumptions around the existence of such a backstop technology is undoubtedly 
questionable (See the box), but from our viewpoint, it has the advantage of translating 
a physical metric (carbon budget in Gt) into a monetary one (Climate Debt expressed 
in €2018). Another advantage is brought by the use of a discount factor, which weights 
less the long-term and reduce therefore the uncertainty around speculative 
projections.
Figure 2. Maps for the years before depletion
Sources: authors' computations, based on IPCC SR1.5, UNFCCC emissions data, Le Quéré et al. (2018) Historical Carbon 
Budget (version 1.3), UN World Population Prospects (2017 revision), AMECO online (11/2018) for 2017 GDP. Calculated 
for +2°C 2/3 probability, hybrid share and consumer approach.
Depletion da tes
 2018 - 2024
 2024 - 2026
 2026 - 2033
 2033 - 2035
 2035 and beyondN° 45, 11 décembre 2018.
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We do not consider here the use of 
Solar Radiation Management (SRM) 
technologies or, more generally, of 
geo-engineering since such technol-
ogies imply irreversibility and uncer-
tainties far beyond what is 
acceptable. 
7.
See “Sucking CO2 out of the             
atmosphere explained” on vox.org 
by Umair Ifran for a quick survey.        
Websites of Climeworks et Carbon 
Engineering provide commercial    
information. Some peer reviewed  
papers are published (Keith et al. 
(2018), “Joule 2”, pp. 1573-1594).
8.
Climate debt is thus calculated using 
the following expression: 
, 
where r is the discount rate, T the 
number of years before the carbon 
budget is exhausted and CO2,T the 
present value of emissions at the date 
T, at which the budget is exhausted.
1
( )
×  Box. The backstop technology
The backstop technology does not replace a potential investment. It is only aiming at 
reducing emissions, in the sense that in does not provide any other benefit than removing 
CO2. Such Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR)
6 technologies are currently experimented in 
some places—Climeworks, Carbon Engineering being active companies in that field.7 It is 
assumed to be more expensive than any other option and with a high enough potential 
capacity to achieve the targeted reduction, as the limit is physical only. The ability to scale 
up the deployment of such technologies is controversial, as well as the cost per tons of CO2
removed from the atmosphere. The ability to store CO2 underground definitively and the 
potential capacity to do so is also disputed. Current cost estimations are mostly industry side 
estimations with only prototype or experimental projects to back up over optimistic 
announcements.
As depicted on the Figure 3, the areas under the emissions pathways serve as the basis 
for the valuation. As it is a flow with a complex time pattern, it is necessary to use a net 
present value to transform it into a stock. We use a standard discounted sum with a 
discount rate representing the social rate of time preference, and potentially, an effect 
of technical progress on this backstop and the uncertainty of future technological 
progress. The discount factor we use there has no implication on intergenerational 
equity, a point that was central to the Stern Review, and is therefore simpler to 
quantify.8 
Observed emissions are projected with current policies scenario. Once the carbon 
budget is exhausted—area 1 in green on Figure 3—, at some date in the future, the 
remaining annual flow of emissions has to be fully abated–area 2 in red. Discount rate r
is applied to the cost of abatement every year (the cost of abatement times the emis-
sions to abate) and summed to get the net present value today of those future costs.
The Table displays important differences between countries. EU6 average is 53% for 
the baseline scenario, Germany climate debt is 66% and France one is 37%. Part of it 
comes from the historical adjustment. The rest is related to a more carbon intensive 
energy mix in some countries than in others. It is a strong divide between Germany 
and France. Recent transition of Germany towards renewable energy has not been 
enough to compensate for the exit from nuclear energy. Our point is not to promote 
Figure 3. Discounting climate debt
Source: authors calculations.
today
Annual CO2 emissions, under 
current policies assumpon
GtCO2
meDate of the carbon budget depleon 
Past emissions
1 Carbon budget 2 Emissions to be abated
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9.
Climate debt is a quantitative indica-
tor which cannot deal with every 
question in the choices to mitigate 
climate change. For instance, nuclear 
energy is a low carbon energy, hence 
improving climate debt when de-
ployed, but implies a set of moral 
choices related basically to safety not 
involved in the debt quantification. 
Environmental policies should not be 
designed only based on emissions  
reduction targets. As safety concerns 
go over borders, at least a European 
Safety Agency for Nuclear Energy 
would be a necessary requirement to 
different paths for energy mix.. one energy mix over another one. It is to acknowledge that our methodology amplifies 
existing state of the economies. 9
Industrial structures—more industry in Germany, much less in France—play defini-
tively a role, except in the baseline scenario where the consumer approach is taken. 
Without this approach, the relative climate debts of France and Germany are in the 1 
to 3 range instead of less than 1 to 2. Again, methodological choices, based on moral 
or political considerations, can lead to a very different appreciation of the situation. 
Alternatives assumptions, especially on how far responsibilities are imputed to EU 
countries may change a lot the evaluation of the climate debt. Accounting for no 
historical carbon adjustment relax the burden of EU countries by a large margin and 
allow for a lot of climate mitigation backloading. This does not point to a cynical direc-
tion to curb climate negotiation. This shows mainly that the responsibility issue is a 
major driver of the final estimate and neglecting this issue may encourage procrastina-
tion and fuel misunderstanding
How indicative is the concept of climate debt?
A monetary evaluation of this climate debt allows giving an alternative metric to the 
distance at which we currently are from reaching a temperature increase target—
namely +2°C—in a unit that pin downs the potential trade-offs in an universally under-
standable way.
Although, Climate debt cannot be compared a public debt for several reasons. The 
climate debt remains uncertain by nature and respond to a set of hypotheses, which 
cannot be accepted by all the parties. On the opposite, public debt is the result of a 
contract between two parties with a well-defined (and universally agreed) flow of 
payments of interest and principal. Whereas Climate debt is a different notion, being 
the net present value of a flow of investment needed under an extreme scenario, where 
you choose to respect commitments but have done nothing so far to respect them.   
For these reasons, climate debt has to be reckoned as a complement to other macroe-
conomic imbalances. A country may seem in a sustainable and prudent situation—a 
low public deficit, a public debt stable at a low ratio to GDP—but may be facing a wall 
due to climate change unpreparedness.
Table. Climate debts, EU 6 largest countries 
 DEU GBR FRA ITA ESP NLD EU-6
Baseline
(see note for definition) 66 53 37 51 41 62 53
(see note for definition)
(vs Consumer) 29 20 11 18 17 49 22
No historical carbon adjustment 
(vs HCA) 4 8 17 12 22 20 12
EU population share
(vs EU emissions share) 95 63 35 45 23 81 61
+1.5°C target  
(vs +2°C) 145 125 92 117 99 123 120
Note: EU6 is the aggregation of the 6 largest economies (2017 GDP).
Sources: authors' computations, based on IPCC SR1.5, OECD emissions data, Le Quéré et al. (2018) Historical Carbon Budget
(version 1.3) and UN World Population Prospects (2017 revision), AMECO online (11/2018) for 2017 GDP.N° 45, 11 décembre 2018.
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The quantification of years before depletion and debt are sensitive to various assump-
tions and hypotheses. Some of those assumptions are in the field of moral position and 
politics. They deal with burden sharing methods. It is not our task, in this report, to 
decide on those rules. Nevertheless, we have shown that the quantifications are very 
different for each scenario. That means that, implicitly, important transfers are done 
when you do not address those issues politically.
Some assumptions are technical issues, some others are related to the use of long-term 
forecasts. It means that the quantification is partly speculative in nature and that little 
can be done to reduce that unpleasant characteristic. This uncertainty has to be under-
stood when discussing the burden sharing issue on the political point of view.
Climate debt and years before depletion concepts shed light on the urgency to miti-
gate climate change. As a rich and developed area, EU is now facing that cliff. We have 
exhausted our procrastination capital and the amount of debt is significant, in the 
range of 20% to 200% of GDP for the +2°C, our point estimate being close to 50% of 
GDP. For the more constraining +1.5°C target, it is much higher, the point estimate 
being close to 120% of GDP. 
However, the quantification of the climate debt should not fuel excuses to despair in 
front of the responsibility ahead. Mitigating the climate is not undoable or too expen-
sive. It is within our reach, making our failure to address it even more condemnable  ■ riefs  Guillaume Allègre
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